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PLEADING
IsADoRE S. BERNSTEIN*
Amendments
Gary v. Jordan' was an action in fraud and deceit based
upon alleged misrepresentations by the defendant to the plain-
tiff in the sale of twenty cows from his herd that the cows
were "clean" and free from disease. The question of pleading
raised upon appeal was the propriety of the ruling of the
trial judge permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint
at the close of his case to conform to the proof. It appeared
from the evidence that these twenty cows were selected from
a group of thirty-one cows which were tested for Bang's dis-
ease, and that the results of the test showed that a number
of these were "suspects," although this information was not
disclosed to the plaintiff when the twenty cows were delivered.
At the close of his case plaintiff was permitted by the trial
judge to amend the language of paragraph 11 of this com-
plaint reading "that the results of such tests showed the pres-
ence of Bang's disease in the cows sold to plaintiff," by chang-
ing the last three words to read "tested by plaintiff," and this
ruling was the basis of an exception upon defendant's appeal.
The Supreme Court held that this amendment effected no
substantial change in plaintiff's claim and that it was, there-
fore, allowable under the appropriate code section.2
Wood v. Hardy3 was an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien.
The contractor for the erection of a dwelling to whom plaintiff
had first furnished materials abandoned construction of the
project and plaintiff thereafter furnished additional materials
under a contract directly with the owner. The mechanic's
lien included charges for materials furnished to the contractor
as well as for labor and materials furnished pursuant to the
new contract with the owner. The complaint contained an
allegation that the labor and materials were furnished pur-
suant to a contract between the plaintiff and the owner who
was named as defendant. Upon appeal from an adverse judg-
*Attorney at Law, Columbia, S. C.
1. 236 S. C. 730, 113 S. E. 2d 730 (1960).
2. 'ODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA § 10-692(d) (1952).
3. 235 S. C. 131, 110 S. E. 2d 157 (1959).
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ment defendant contended that the statement in the mechanic's
lien and in the complaint that the materials and labor were
furnished pursuant to a contract between the plaintiff and
,defendant was fatal since it included a claim for materials
:furnished to the contractor; defendant contended further
that the allowance of an amendment to the complaint by the
Special Referee, deleting the allegation that -the materials
-were furnished pursuant to a contract between the owner and
the plaintiff, was in error.
The Supreme Court held that the allegations in the com-
plaint to the effect that the plaintiff furnished labor and
materials in the construction of defendant's dwelling for which
he had not been paid, and that he had a mechanic's lien on
the property, were appropriate allegations for the foreclosure
of a mechanic's lien, and the allegation as to the existence of a
contract between the plaintiff and the defendants could be
disregarded as mere surplusage. As to the allowance of the
amendment, it was held that the lower court could properly
allow an amendment to conform the pleading to the facts
proved provided such amendment did not materially change
the claim of the party seeking the same. Since the allegation
as to the existence of the contract between plaintiff and de-
fendant was considered as surplusage, the court concluded
that the allowance of the amendment deleting this allegation
did not result in prejudice to defendant. The case was, how-
ever, reversed in part on other grounds and remanded to the
trial court for determination of the amount the defendant
owed the contractor at the time of abandonment of the project,
since the plaintiff's claim as to materials furnished the con-
tractor could not exceed the amount due him by the owner.
Motions to Strike
The appeal in Thomas v. Colonial Store, Inc." was based
entirely upon the pleadings. The trial judge granted defend-
ant's motion to strike certain allegations from the complaint
and refused plaintiff's motion to strike the second defense
of defendant's answer. The action was brought for false im-
prisonment, the pertinent allegations being that plaintiff was
detained by defendant's agents after leaving defendant's store,
was arrested and confined to the city jail, and was re-
quired to furnish bond and to employ an attorney in order to
4. 236 S. C. 95, 113 S. E. 2d 337 (1960).
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obtain a release. In its second defense, defendant alleged
that the plaintiff was observed by its store manager to pick
up a jar of coffee and conceal it on her person and for that
reason was detained and turned over to the police authorities.
Although recognizing that an order refusing a motion to strike
allegations in a pleading is not ordinarily subject to inter-
locutory appeal, the Supreme Court nevertheless considered
the appeal from the order refusing to strike this defense.
The motion in this instance was considered to be in the nature
of a demurrer involving the merits and going to the heart of
the defense. The court noted that the essence of false im-
prisonment consists in depriving the plaintiff of his liberty
without lawful justification. The facts alleged in the second
defense were held to be relevant on the question as to whether
or not the plaintiff's arrest and detention were lawful, and
were properly pleaded in justification of her arrest.
As to the order striking from the complaint the allegation
that plaintiff was required to furnish bond in order to be
released from the jail and to employ an attorney, the Supreme
Court held that this language was improperly stricken. The
plaintiff could properly plead and show the circumstances
under which she was released from custody and could claim
any reasonable expenses incurred in procuring her release.
In Vanderford v. Smith5 action was brought for damages
arising out of an automobile collision in the City of Union.
The defendant interposed a counterclaim alleging that plain-
tiff's automobile was in use as a taxicab at the time of the
collision, and that plaintiff was covered by liability insurance
pursuant to the ordinances of, the town, and moved for an
order impleading the alleged insurer as a party defendant to
the counterclaim. The lower court refused the motion and by
a companion order granted plaintiff's motion to strike from
the answer and counterclaim all references to the insurance
company and to the policy. On appeal both orders were re-
versed under the authority of Brown v. Quinn.6 The recent
case of Watts v. Baker7 was distinguished as involving an
ordinance different from the case at hand.
The refusal of the trial judge to strike from the complaint
the language that plaintiff has been damaged in his livelihood
of operating a taxicab was affirmed. Defendant argued in his
5. 235 S. C. 448, 111 S. E. 2d 777 (1960).
6. 220 S. C. 426, 68 S. E. 2d 326 (1951).
7. 233 S. C. 446, 105 S. E. 2d 605 (1958).
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brief that loss of use of a demolished automobile was not
an element of damages. The Supreme Court did not construe
the language as alleging damages for loss of use and found it
unnecessary to pass upon the question raised by defendant.
Swift & Co. v. Griggs" involved an appeal from the order
of the trial judge striking certain defenses from the answer.
The complaint alleged that two of the defandants agreed to sell
plaintiff's plant food on a commission basis and to guarantee
payment of all accounts to plaintiff, and that a third defendant
agreed in writing to guarantee performance of the agreement
by the other two. The answer contained three defenses: (1)
a general denial, (2) plaintiff's failure to perform an alleged
contemporaneous oral agreement, (3) failure of consideration
by reason of non-delivery of the plant foods. Upon plaintiff's
motion, the lower court struck the entire second defense as
sham, irrelevant and redundant and as an attempt to vary
the terms of the written instrument, and that portion of the
third defense which alleged failure of consideration. The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the second defense and
the stricken language of the third defense were attempts to
plead the defense of failure of consideration based upon the
alleged breach of a contemporaneous oral agreement incon-
sistent with the terms of the written agreement to the extent
of rendering it meaningless. This the defendants could not
do in the absence of a plea of fraud, accident or mistake.
Separate Statement
The appeal in Hopkins v. Shuman9 was from the order of the
trial judge denying defendants' motion to state separately
the causes of action alleged in the complaint. Defendants con-
tended that two causes of action were stated: (1) false im-
prisonment, and (2) inducing the discharge of plaintiff from
his former employment. Plaintiff's position was that the
complaint stated only one cause of action for false imprison-
ment and that the other allegations were of aggravating cir-
cumstances. The pertinent facts alleged in the complaint
were that plaintiff was the driver of the truck of an inde-
pendent contractor engaged to pick up packages from the
warehouse of the defendant's railway; that he was approached
by a special agent of the company and was taken to the police
8. 235 S. C. 60, 109 S. E. 2d 710 (1959).
9. 235 S. C. 191, 110 S. E. 2d 713 (1959).
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station for questioning with respect to certain articles which
were missing; that he was kept in custody for two days and
given lie detector tests; that his family were questioned and he
was accused of being a thief and that upon his release from
custody the defendants procured his discharge from his em-
ployment.
The Supreme Court adopted defendants' contention that
two causes of action were alleged, i.e., false imprisonment
and wrongful interference with plaintiff's employment, and
concluded that defendants were entitled to a separate state-
ment of the causes of action. The court noted that under
applicable provisions of the code and circuit court rules speci-
fied causes of action may be joined in the same complaint but
must be separately stated.10 The defendants' procedure in
requiring a separate statement of the causes of action was
held to be proper.
Waiver
In Edwards v. Great American Insurance Co." the Supreme
Court followed the rule that waiver of a condition subsequent
in an insurance policy need not be pleaded in order for evi-
dence of waiver to be admissible. That case involved an
action to recover the face amount of a policy insuring plain-
tiff's dwelling against loss by fire. Among other defenses,
defendant plead that the plaintiff had procured additional
insurance on the property in excess of its agreed valuation
and that this was in violation of the policy provisions, thereby
relieving defendant of liability on the policy. The testimony
of plaintiff that he had informed defendant's agents of the
additional insurance was held admissible on the issue of
waiver of the forfeiture provisions of the policy even though
waiver had not been plead, because the plaintiff was not
required to allege waiver of a condition subsequent in his
complaint. The court held further that the plaintiff did not
need to reply to new matter in the answer alleging breach of
a condition subsequent unless ordered to do so by the court
on defendant's motion, under the applicable Code section.' 2
10. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-701 (1952); Circuit Court
Rule 18.
11. 234 S. C. 404,108 S. E. 2d 582 (1959).
12. CODE OF LAWS OF SoUTH CAROLINA § 10-661 (1952).
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Special Damages
In Corley v. S. C. Highway Dept.3 action was brought for
damages to plaintiff's building resulting from the moving of
the same by the defendant in violation of defendant's agree-
ment that the building would be in as good condition as be-
fore it was moved. Plaintiff contended that the building was
damaged beyond repair and sought recovery for the fair
market value before removal. The question on appeal re-
volved around the refusal of the trial judge to charge de-
fendant's request that the jury not be permitted to consider
future damages to the building. The Supreme Court found
no error in the charge and held that it was unnecessary to
determine whether future settling of the building would con-
stitute damages as may be proved under a general allegation
of damages or whether this would constitute special damages
which must be specially pleaded, since it did not appear that
the jury considered any damages other than those naturally
resulting from the acts complained of.
Demurrer-Sufficiency
The sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint was
tested by demurrer in Strong v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.14 The
plaintiffs were property owners in a residential area of the
Town of York and sought to enjoin the erection of a large
supermarket in the neighborhood, alleging that the operation
would deprive them of the quiet enjoyment of their home
and would be injurious to their health. In reversing the
sustention of demurrer by the lower court, the Supreme Court
reiterated the well settled rule that the facts properly pleaded
must be taken as true when attacked by demurrer and the
pleadings must be construed liberally in favor of the pleader.
The court refused to say as a matter of law that the operation
of the supermarket under all of the circumstances would not
amount to a private nuisance and held that the factual issues
raised could not be decided on the pleadings.
In Jackson v. Hobbs15 the order of the trial judge sustaining
a demurrer to the complaint was adopted as the judgment of
the Supreme Court. The complaint sought a recovery of dam-
ages allegedly sustained by reason of the acts of the defend-
13. 234 S. C. 504, 109 S. E. 2d 164 (1959).
14. 235 S. C. 552, 112 S. E. 2d 646 (1960).
15. 234 S. C. 497, 109 S. E. 2d 161 (1959).
[Vol. 13
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ants in reducing the amount of fire insurance on plaintiff's
store in violation of an alleged fiduciary relationship. The
court concluded that the allegations in the complaint that the
acts of the defendants were fraudulent and that they acted in
a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff were merely conclus-
ions unsupported by the facts alleged and such conclusions
were not admitted on demurrer.
Demurrer-Capacity
In Sloan v. City of Greenville'6 an action was brought by
plaintiff as "taxpayer, citizen, resident and user of the streets
of the city of Greenville on behalf of himself and all others in
like situation" to enjoin the city from granting a permit for
the construction of a parking building which would overhang
and encroach upon the public streets. Upon the appeal by
plaintiff from the order of the trial judge denying the injunc-
tive relief prayed for, the respondent raised the question
as to the right of plaintiff to bring the action in the absence of
an allegation that he had sustained or would sustain special
damages different in degree and kind from that of the general
public. In dismissing this contention, the Supreme Court
noted that the complaint showed upon its face the capacity in
which plaintiff brought the action and held that the question
should have been raised by demurrer under the appropriate
Code section.17 Since the respondent did not demur, the ob-
jection would be considered waived under authority of Brain-
lett v. Young.' 8 The order denying injunctive relief was
reversed because the proposed use of the street was incon-
sistent with its dedication for public purposes.
Demurrer-Jurisdiction
The appeal in Brother International Corporation v. South-
eastern Sales Company19 was from the order of the lower
court over-ruling plaintiff's demurrer to counterclaims im-
posed in an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the Rich-
land County Court and granting defendant's motion to trans-
fer the action to the court of common pleas. The plaintiff
sought recovery of the balance due on an account in the
amount of about $3,000.00 and defendant filed counterclaims
16. 235 S. C. 277, 111 S. E. 2d 573 (1959).
17. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLiNA § 10-642 (1952).
18. 229 S. C. 519, 93 S. E. 2d 873 (1956).
19. 234 S. C. 573, 109 S. E. 2d 441 (1959).
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in the sum of $55,000.00, and simultaneously moved to transfer
the cause to the court of common pleas. The decision re-
versing the county court rested solely upon the proposition
enunciated in DuPre v. Giland20 that a set off or counterclaim
in excess of the jurisdictional amount will not be permitted
to oust the jurisdiction with respect to the claim asserted in
the complaint where such is within the jurisdiction of the
court. The court, however, failed to discuss the interesting
question posed in respondent's brief as to the power and
authority of the county court to transfer an action to the
court of common pleas in order to promote the due adminis-
tration of justice. Respondent's counsel (the writer herein)
contended that such power in the county court rested both
upon statutory authority and the court's inherent power to
do all things reasonably necessary for the due administration
of justice.21 The opinion does not dwell upon this feature of
the case.
Filing Answer
The refusal of the trial judge to permit defendant to file
an answer to the complaint after the expiration of the twenty
day period was held to be an abuse of discretion in McGee v.
one Chevrolet sedan.22 The action" was commenced by the
service of a summons and a writ of attachment on the de-
fendant automobile as the result of a collision between it and
an automobile owned by the plaintiff. On the nineteenth day
after service, defendant's attorney telephoned attorney for
plaintiff advising him that he had just been employed to
represent the defendant and inquired as to the status of the
proceeding. In reply, plaintiff's attorney stated that he did
not know how much time remained for answer. Two days
later, on the twenty-first day after service of the summons,
defendant's attorney delivered to plaintiff's attorney a notice
of appearance and a demand for a copy of the complaint
which was refused. The trial judge denied defendant's motion
20. 156 S.C. 109, 152 S. E. 873 (1930).
21. Respondent contended that CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA
§ 15-730 (1952), provides statutory authority for the transfer. Although
this Act as originally passed was limited to Orangeburg County, the Act
as adopted in the 1952 Code deletes all reference to Orangeburg County
and would seem to be of general application by its terms. Respondent
argted that the provisions of the Code section would control over the
original Act where substantial changes were made, relying upon the
authority of State v. Conally, 227 S. C. 507, 88 S. E. 2d 591 (1955).
22. 235 S. C. 37, 109 S. E. 2d 713 (1959).
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for permission to file an answer to the complaint and granted
plaintiff's motion for judgment by default, from which ruling
the appeal followed. In reversing, the Supreme Court held
that the Act providing that the court may in its discretion
allow an answer to be filed after the expiration of the time
limit is in furtherance of justice and should be construed
liberally.2 3 The ruling of the trial judge would not be dis-
turbed unless there was a clear showing of abuse of discretion;
but when a party makes a showing of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect and applies promptly for relief
and makes a showing of a meritorious defense, he should be
permitted to answer. Since defendant's attorney had been
employed prior to the expiration of the twenty day period
after service and was acting in good faith, he should have been
advised upon his inquiry that only one more day remained for
answer. In view of these circumstances, the refusal of de-
fendant's motion that it be permitted to file an answer was
deemed to be an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.
Waiver and Estoppel
The question of pleading in Douglas v. ThreadgiU4 was
whether or not the allegations of defendant's answer suf-
ficiently alleged estoppel so as to require a charge by the trial
judge of the law applicable thereto. The action was based
upon the alleged breach of a sales contract to convey certain
real estate by "good warranty deed," by reason of the inser-
tion in the deed of a reference to a joint easement of an 18
foot driveway. The answer alleged that plaintiff's attorney
examined the title prior to consummation of the sale, knew
of the existence of the easement, and prepared the deed in
which the provision relating to the easement was inserted;
and that plaintiff was estopped from maintaining the action
by reason of having accepted the deed with knowledge ac-
tual, constructive and imputed of the existence of the ease-
ment. The trial judge refused defendant's request to charge
the law applicable to estoppel and error was charged on ap-
peal.
In ordering a new trial, the Supreme Court noted that de-
fendant did not specifically plead waiver but such could be
proved without doing so under the authority of Devore v. Pied-
23. CoD. oF LAWS op SoUTH CAROLINA § 10-609 (1952).
24. 235 S. C. 169, 110 S. E. 2d 169 (1960).
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mont Insurance Company'; and that estoppel was specially
pleaded. The court held that a reasonable inference might
be drawn, in light of the pleadings and the testimony, that
the purchaser bought the property with full knowledge of the
existence of the driveway and defendant's inability to con-
vey title free of the easement, and this would make a jury
question as to estoppel by plaintiff to maintain the action.
25. 144 S. C. 417,142 S. E. 592 (1928).
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